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Basle Committee International Capital

Adequacy Standards: Analysis and
Implications for the Banking Industry
Duncan E. Alford*
I.

Introduction

In July 1988 after several years of negotiation among banking
regulators, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices1 issued its final risk-based capital standards for
banking institutions. Twelve nations signed the accord and agreed to
implement the capital guidelines.' The growing interdependence of
the international banking system and the varying levels of bank capital mandated by regulators in different nations led to the need for
equivalent requirements among banks worldwide.
The Basle Committee's capital standards represent a significant
step toward the convergence of international banking regulations.
This advance is not without its critics. In the 1991 Annual Economic
Report of the President, the Council of Economic Advisors stressed
that the capital guidelines are decreasing the availability of credit in
the United States.3 However, others believe that the new capital
standards will be beneficial to the international financial system.
* B.A. with High Distinction, University of Virginia, 1985; J.D. with Honors, University
of North Carolina School of Law, 1991; Judicial Clerk, Supreme Court of North Carolina,
Raleigh, NC (1991-92).
I. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices [hereinafter
Basle Committee] is a group of twelve nations whose banking authorities meet periodically to
discuss banking supervision. These authorities have reached regulatory agreements in the past.
The bank regulatory authorities of the following twelve nations are members of the Committee: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides staff support for the Basle Committee. The BIS is an organization of
central banks that serves as both a forum where central bankers meet to discuss current financial issues and as an international financial institution. See generally Hackney & Shafer, The
Regulation of International Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, I I N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 474 (1986).
2. Final InternationalRisk-based Capital Standards Adopted by the Basle Committee
on Banking Regulations: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards, 51 BNA's BANKING REPORT 143 (July 25, 1988) [hereinafter Basle Standards].
3. Riddell, Bank Capital Standards 'May Tighten Loans', Financial Times, Feb. 13,
1991, at 4. See also Golembe, A Worrisome Trend: The Relentless March of Capital Regulation, BANKING POLIcY REPORT, Sept. 16, 1991, at 2. Capital regulation "has been transformed into a broad regulatory objective with a life of its own". Id.
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With the increasing instability of this system due to the imprudent
credit policies taken by some banks, one commentator has stated
that the Basle Committee's capital standards represent the "single
most important regulatory response to the breakdown of the credit
system." 4
This article will initially focus on the functions of capital in the
banking industry. It will then analyze the Basle Committee's capital
standards, comparing them to prior adequacy regulations in the
United States as well as to the standards implemented by some signatory nations. Finally, this article will report on changes in the
banking industry caused by the capital standards and analyze future
implications of these standards.
II.

Background

A.

Importance and Function of Bank Capital

Bank capital generally consists of the following three primary
7
elements: subordinated debt,5 preferred stock,' and common equity.
Subordinated debt includes interest-bearing obligations that pay a
fixed amount at a future date.8 Preferred stock consists of equity
issues whose dividend payment is generally fixed. 9 Common equity
consists of common stock, surplus, undivided profits, and equity reserve accounts.'" The Basle Committee's standards specifically define
the elements to be included in bank capital."
Capital in banking institutions serves a different function than
in non-financial enterprises. One analyst explained the difference in
this manner:
In most business firms, the primary function of capital is to
finance the purchase of buildings, machinery and equipment. Its
secondary function is to protect long- and short-term creditors,
who make funds available to the business. In banking, however,
the function of capital is primarily to serve as a cushion or in4. L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER SIEGE 58
(1988).
5. Holders of subordinated debt take after secured creditors have satisfied their claims
on the issuer's assets. G. HEMPEL, A. COLEMAN, & D. SIMONSON, BANK MANAGEMENT: TEXT
AND CASES 271 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter G. HEMPEL].
6. Preferred stock fixes dividend and asset claims in a stated amount and is subordinated to the claims of depositors and other bank creditors. Preferred stock does not mature
and may be convertible into common stock. E. Gardner, Capital Adequacy and Banking Supervision 7 (Bangor Occasional Papers in Economics No. 19, 1981).
7. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 260.
8. Id. at 261. Subordinated debt may be convertible into common stock. Some variable
rate debt may be convertible into fixed rate debt. Life insurance companies and pension funds
tend to be heavy purchasers of these securities. Id. *
9. E. Gardner, supra note 6, at 7; HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 261.
10. E. Gardner, supra note 6, at 261.
11. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
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surance fund to absorb losses that may occur. As a source of
funds for the acquisition of physical assets, bank capital serves a
secondary function. 2
The United States Comptroller of the Currency made a similar point
in the following official statement:
Bank capital has myriad uses and purposes. It allows a
bank to gain competitive entry by acquiring the necessary infrastructure to operate. It provides a cushion to withstand abnormal losses not covered by current earnings, enabling the bank to
regain equilibrium and re-establish a normal earnings pattern. It
serves the important psychological role of maintaining the confidence of public lenders in the bank's ability to meet maturing
demands in most market conditions, to sustain present and contemplated growth patterns and to conform to industry standards.
In liquidation it provides protection to both depositors and other
creditors."
In essence, bank capital serves four primary functions. First, it
inspires public confidence in the bank's viability by absorbing unanticipated losses.14 Second, it protects uninsured depositors in the
event of bank insolvency. 5 Third, it pays for the acquisition of physical plants and other resources necessary to operate the bank.' 6 Fi7
nally, it serves as a regulatory restraint on unjustified asset growth.'
Of these four, the inspiration of public confidence is the primary
function of capital.' Depositors must be confident that their money
is safe at the bank: Shareholders must feel assured that their investments will not be lost because of imprudent credit policies. Bank regulators must be confident that the bank is in sound financial condition, especially in the United States (U.S.) due to its closely
regulated private banking system. 9
Capital adequacy of a bank is not the complete solution to ensuring the soundness of the banking system.2 0 For instance, sufficient
capital would not have prevented the less developed countries' loan
crisis. That condition resulted from the unwise credit policies of
some money center banks in the U.S. 1 Similarly, Texas banks had
12. E. Gardner, supra note 6, at 7.
13. Id. at 10.
14. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 271.
15. Id. at 272.
16. id.
17. Id. at 272.
18. Id. at 273.
19. Id.
20. Norton, The Multidimensions of the Convergence Processes Regarding the Prudential Supervision of InternationalBanking Activities - The Impact of the Basle Supervisors
Committee's Efforts Upon, Within, and Without the European Community, in FESTSCHRIFT IN
HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD 252 (W. Ebke & J. J. Norton ed. 1990).
21. Id.
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excess capital in the 1980s when they made imprudent loans in the
real estate and energy industries. Thus, a lack of capital was not the
root cause of the subsequent Texas bank failures."
As illustrated by the examples above, adequate bank capital will
not prevent bank failures.23 In reality, capital adequacy is only one
of many factors that affects bank instability and failure.2 4 Nevertheless, in its effort to coordinate bank regulation among nations, the
Basle Committee has focused on capital adequacy and, in particular,
its effect on credit risk.
B.

Purpose of Basle Risk-based Capital Standards

The growth of the international banking system and the interdependence of the world economy created the need for common bank
capital standards across borders.2 5 To foster stability in the system,
bank regulators must cooperate to establish competitive equality. 6
Before the Basle standards were issued, regulators worldwide did not
require financial institutions to maintain an equivalent capital level,
which resulted in very uneven requirements among nations.2 7 Banks
in nations with weak capital regulations had a competitive advantage
and could offer products at a lower price.2 This situation created
anomalies within the banking system. A common capital standard
among the major industrial nations was needed to create a level29
playing field.
Another concern among international banking regulators was
that banks were increasing their involvement in off-balance sheet activities. 0 Previous capital adequacy regulations did not govern these
off-balance sheet activities. Without adequate funds supporting these
activities, regulators believed that the banking system was vulnerable
22. Id.
23. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 272.
24. Norton, supra note 20, at 282. Other regulatory issues regarding bank soundness
include liquidity, quality and level of earnings, investment and loan portfolio concentrations,
quality of loans and investments, effectiveness of loan policies, and management's overall ability to monitor risks. Id.
25. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: IMPLEMENTATION OF
RISK-BASED CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS 8 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter GAO].
26. Norton, supra note 20, at 254.
27. Cooke, A Comparative Look at U.S. and European FinancialRegulation, BANKING
EXPANSION REP., July 16, 1990, at 1.
28. For instance, banks were able to charge lower interest rates on loans or charge
smaller fees for services such as cash management.
29. Paul Volcker when he served as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System believed that "the need for parity of capital standards on an international
basis" was pressing because, without parity, the international banking system will not be
sound, stable, and competitive in the long run. Norton, supra note 20, at 255.
Some analysts say that a principal impetus to the Basle capital standards was to constrain
the growth of aggressive Japanese banks in the international banking markets. Osborn & Evans, Cooke's Medicine: Kill or Cure? EUROMONEY, July, 1988, at 34 [hereinafter Osborn].
30. Norton, supra note 20, at 255-56.
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to economic downturns. 3s The Basle Committee's capital standards
now require banks to include their off-balance
sheet activities when
32
calculating their total risk-weighted assets.
Common capital standards will also fulfill other objectives of
regulators. First, they will inspire the regulators' confidence that the
banks could withstand any unforeseen losses. 3 Second, a common
capital standard set at the proper level 3 will strengthen the banking
system and prevent a financial disturbance in one country from
spreading and triggering defaults in other nations.3 5 Finally, a capital standard gives the bank a stake in its future and discourages it
from taking excessive risks with government insured deposits.3 6
Besides equalizing bank capital levels, the Basle Committee's
standards will increase the required amount of capital, at least in
some countries. A stronger capital requirement will place a market
test on banks and force them to prove to investors that they can
generate adequate returns on the capital invested." Furthermore, a
stronger capital position will allow banks to take advantage of unexpected business opportunities, such as acquisitions when they arise. 38
However, stronger capital requirements do have their costs. Capital
is an expensive source of funds for banks.3 - An increase in the
amount of capital required by regulators increases the banks' costs
of doing business' 0 and restrains their ability to increase deposits or
loans." If other bank competitors do not have the same capital re2
quirements, serious competitive disadvantages result.'
C. Brief History of Capital Adequacy Regulation in the United
States
Historically, state and federal bank regulators in the United
States could set initial capital levels for banks as part of their licens31. Id. at 254.
32. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 149.
33. Norton, supra note 20, at 253.
34. Determining the proper level is an important question not completely resolved by
bank regulators , economists, or commentators. Brumbaugh & Litan, The Banks are Worse
Off Than You Think, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 5-6 [hereinafter Brumbaugh].
35. Norton, supra note 20, at 252.
36. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits in the United
States. Most European countries likewise have some type of depository insurance scheme.
Other commentators are more blunt and say high capital standards keep the unscrupulous
from entering the banking business. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 4. See generally Banking
Regulators Report on Capital Standards: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 72 (1990) (statement of Wayne D. Angell,
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Senate Report).
37. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 72-73.
38. Id. at 73.
39. Norton, supra note 20, at 252.
40. Id.
41. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 5.
42. Norton, supra note 20, at 252.
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ing function, but could not set specific capital levels to absorb unforeseen losses.4 Beginning in the early twentieth century, a capitalto-deposits ratio was used by U.S. bank regulators as a measure of
capital adequacy."" The rule of thumb was that a 10% ratio was
5
adequate.1
In the late 1940s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) used a capital to risk-adjusted assets measure.46 Risk-adjusted assets were calculated by subtracting cash and U.S. government securities from total assets.4 7 In a separate effort in 1952, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York developed a method for calculating minimum bank capital by assigning assets to one of six riskweight categories.4" The Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB)
staff developed another capital adequacy formula called the ABC
formula in 1956, but abandoned it before implementation because it
demanded excessive capital.49
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the OCC regulators moved
away from capital adequacy ratios as a form of regulation and decided to consider selected factors on a case-by-case basis in evaluating banks. 50 This change resulted from the regulators' realization
that bank capital was only one of several factors determinative of the
soundness of a financial institution. In the late 1970s, the OCC, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the FRB compared selected financial ratios to peer averages as the method to determine capital adequacy. 5 ' This ratio comparison technique became
part of the CAMEL 2 scheme of regulation.
In the early 1980s, the OCC attempted to make low capital
levels an unsafe and unsound banking practice. 53 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of
43. NATIONAL BANK ACT, 12 U.S.C.A. § 21 (1989).
44. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 277. A capital to deposits ratio is a ratio of the bank's
capital (shareholder equity and certain long-term debt) to the deposits (both business and
consumer) the bank holds for its customers.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 278. The six risk-weight percentage categories were the following: 0%, 5%,
12%, 20%, 50%, and 100%. Id.
49. Id. The ABC formula combined a capital adequacy test and a liquidity test in determining the required level of capital. Banks involved in arbitrage, mainly money center banks,
were required to maintain excessive levels of capital under this formula. The FRB quickly
abandoned this concept.
50. Id. at 278.
51. Id. at 279. The ratios regulators used included: equity capital/total assets, loans/
total capital, fixed assets/capital, and asset growth rate/capital growth rate.
52. CAMEL refers to the five rating criteria in a bank examination: capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC) formed in 1979 developed this uniform rating system. Each financial institution regulator uses this same general framework.
53. Puleo, Balance Sheet Restructuring/ Capital Adequacy, 1989 INSTITUTE OF BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 462 (1989).
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the Currency overturned this regulatory change.5 4 During this same
period, the U.S. Congress was concerned about excessive loans extended to less developed nations, particularly those made by the
money center banks. If banks charged off the entire loss on these
loans, some would have had a negative amount of capital. 6 Congress' concern led to the passage of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA) 57 which authorized bank regulators to set
"minimum levels of capital" for banks.5 8 Furthermore, ILSA allowed the maintenance of a low level of capital to be considered an
unsafe and unsound banking practice59 and effectively overruled the
Bellaire decision.6 0 Thus, capital adequacy became a legitimate regulatory objective.6 '
In 1985, after several years of varying capital levels, the three
principal federal bank regulators6" agreed on equivalent capital
guidelines for banks.63 Banks and bank holding companies 4 were required to maintain 5.5% primary capital to adjusted total assets65
and 6 % total capital to adjusted total assets.6 6 These minimum capi-,
tal guidelines had several unintentional effects. They encouraged
banks to sell low yield, low risk assets for high yield, high risk assets
because total assets were not differentiated for risk. 7 Also, banks'
pursuits of off-balance sheet activities increased since these regulatory capital standards did not account for these activities.6 8
As more banks began to fail in the late 1980s, Congress passed
legislation requiring bank regulators to implement capital standards
for both banks and savings and loans institutions. 9 In January 1987
54. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1983).
55. Money center banks are generally the larger banks located in major financial centers, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco. The recent growth of
regional banks in Atlanta, Charlotte, and Columbus has overshadowed the importance of the
money center banks.
56. Puleo, supra note 53, at 462.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1983).
58. Id. § 3907(a)(1).
59. Id. § 3907(b)(1).
60. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1983).
61. Norton, supra note 20, at 284.
62. The three principal federal banking regulators are the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
63. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 279.
64. A bank holding company (BHC) is a corporation that has a bank subsidiary and
possibly non-bank subsidiaries that engage in closely related non-bank activities.
65. Id. 12 C.F.R. § 325.3 (1991).
66. G. HEMPEL, supra note 5, at 279.
67. Orabutt, The Bank Industry's Controversial Quest for Capital Adequacy, Amer.
Banker, Feb. 26, 1991, at 10A, col. I. For instance, banks sold U.S. Treasury bonds and
purchased riskier corporate bonds or made risky real estate loans.
68. Id. See also Norton, supra note 20, at 278.
69. Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987);
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the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England entered into an agreement to implement common risk-based capital standards for banks
in their respective countries. 70 This agreement served as a catalyst
for the conclusion of on-going discussions of the Basle Committee
meeting in Switzerland.
In December 1987 the Basle Committee issued its proposed
risk-based capital standards for comment. 71 After making some
changes to the standards based upon these comments, the Basle
Committee issued its final standards in July 1988.72 Bank regulators
in the twelve signatory countries will implement the final standards
by December 31, 1992.73 Meanwhile, international banks within the
signatory nations must have met the interim standards by December
31, 1990.74
III.

Basle Capital Guidelines

In developing the capital guidelines the Basle Committee intended to achieve two main objectives: to improve the soundness and
stability of the world financial system by increasing capital among
the major international banks and to create competitive equality
among international banks by having them maintain equivalent
amounts of capital.7" The guidelines focused principally on regulating credit risk and secondarily on country transfer risk.76
The final guidelines comprise four principal components. First,
the guidelines provide a common definition of bank capital. Second,
they assign bank assets to one of five risk-weight percentages. Third,
they include off-balance sheet activities in the calculation of riskweighted assets by using a conversion factor for each off-balance
sheet activity. Fourth, they set a minimum bank capital level as a
percentage of risk-weighted assets and allow for a transitional period
with interim capital targets to ease the implementation of this new
form of capital regulation.77 In sum, the capital adequacy formula is:
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 10173, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
70. BIS REV. No. 43 (March 3, 1987); BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. (Feb. 1987); 52
FED. REG. 5135 (Feb. 19, 1987).
71. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 143.
72. Id. at 150 (para. 50).
73. Japanese banks have until March 31, 1993, to attain the final capital standard of
8% capital to risk-adjusted assets.
74. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 150 (para. 49).
75. Id. at 143 (para. 3). See also supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
76. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 147 (para. 33). Country transfer risk is equivalent
to sovereign credit risk. Capital guidelines dealing with other risks banks face (i.e., interest
rate risk) are under discussion by the Basle Committee. See infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
77. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 149-50.
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minimum
capital ratio

.

Tier I capital + Tier 2 capital
risk-adjusted +
off-balance
assets
sheet items

First, the Basle Committee agreed on a common international
definition of bank capital. Bank capital is divided into two components: Tier 1 capital or core capital and Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital. 78 Tier I capital includes permanent equity capital such
as common equity. 9 For example, noncumulative preferred stock is
included in Tier I capital, while cumulative preferred stock is not. 80
Tier I capital is also composed of disclosed reserves or retained earnings as well as minority investment interests in subsidiaries. 8 1
On the other hand, Tier 2 capital consists of elements not considered to be as permanent as the Tier 1 elements. For example, Tier
2 capital includes undisclosed reserves that are accepted by that nation's bank regulatory authorities as capital.8 2 Tier 2 capital is also
composed of revaluation reserves or the hidden profits in a bank's
securities portfolio up to a limit of 45% of the hidden gain. 83 In
addition, loan and lease loss reserves for general unanticipated losses
are a part of Tier 2 capital.84 Loan loss reserves are limited to 1.5 %
of risk-weighted assets during the transition period up to December
31, 1992, and limited to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets after that
date."5
Hybrid debt-equity instruments may be included in Tier 2 capital as well.8 6 The distinguishing characteristics of these instruments
are that they are unsecured, subordinated, and fully paid: Also, they
are not redeemable and are available to participate in bank losses. In
addition, their service obligations can be deferred.87 These instruments include perpetual preferred shares and long-term preferred
78. Id. at 150-51.
79. Id. at 144 (para. 12-14).
80. Id. With noncumulative preferred shares, if the corporation fails to pay a dividend in
one quarter, it need not ever pay it because the dividends do not accumulate. With cumulative
preferred, if the corporation fails to pay the dividend the corporation must pay the dividend in
arrears before it pays dividends on common shares.
81. Id. Retained earnings consist of the amount of net income not paid out to shareholders in dividends.,
82. Id. at 145. Undisclosed reserves consist of retained earnings and other funds available to support the bank but not disclosed on publicly available financial statements.
83. Id. This provision was proposed by Japanese bank regulatory authorities and particularly benefits Japanese banks in attaining the minimum capital standards.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Basle Committee in February 1991 proposed an amendment that more
clearly defines loan loss reserves that may be included in Tier 2 capital. Proposalfor the
inclusion of general provisions! general loan-loss reserves in Capital,30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1009 (1991). The Basle Committee officially amended the loan loss reserves provisions of
the capital standards in December 1991. Basle Committee Amends InternationalCapital Accord, 57 BNA's BANKING REPORT 913 (Dec. 2, 1991). The effect of the amendment on U.S.
banks is expected to be minimal. Id.
86. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 146.
87. Id. at 152.
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shares in Canada, titres participatifsand titres subordonns a duroc
indktrmine in France, Genusscheine in Germany, perpetual debt
instruments in the United Kingdom, and mandatory convertible debt
instruments in the United States.8 8 Subordinated debt is also a Tier
2 component if it has a minimum original term of five years.8 9 Its
value must be amortized 20% per year during the last five years of
its term.9" The contribution of subordinated debt to Tier 2 capital is
limited to 50% of Tier 1 capital. 9
The capital guidelines specify some deductions from bank capi92
tal. After January 1, 1993, banks must deduct all goodwill from
Tier 1 capital. 93 Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries must be
deducted from the capital amount, and the assets of these subsidiaries must be deducted from the risk-weighted assets of the bank. At
their discretion, national banking authorities may require banks to
deduct equity cross-holdings in other banks.94 The Basle Committee
did not require the deduction of cross-holdings because these investments aid in the current restructuring of the banking industry in
some nations. 95
Second, all bank assets are assigned to a risk-weight percentage
category," which the Basle Committee specifies as the following:
0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, or 100%."' The 0% category comprises
claims on central governments and central banks in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)9 8 and in countries with special lending arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which are associated with the IMF's General Arrangements to Borrow. 99 Also included within this category are cash,
88. Id. at 146.
89. Subordinated debt is generally those bonds whose holders, in case of bankruptcy,
have a preference to corporate assets just before preferred shareholders and after senior debt
holders are paid.
90. In other words, the bank must deduct one-fifth of the value of the subordinated debt
each year during the five years before the maturity date of the issue.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. U.S. regulations allow some goodwill to be included in bank capital under a
grandfather provision. See infra notes 153-55 and 249-53 and accompanying text. Goodwill
informally refers to the going concern value of a business. In accounting terms, it is the difference between the sale price of a business and the fair market value of the assets of that
business.
94. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 146 (para. 25-27). Equity cross-holdings occur
when banks purchase each other's shares.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 147.
97. The U.S. banking regulators did not take advantage of the 10% risk weight
category.
98. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) include the following nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
99. Currently, Saudi Arabia has made this arrangement with the International Mone-
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loans collateralized by cash or central government securities,1 00 and
claims on non-OECD central banks and governments if funded in
local currency and supported by liabilities in local currency. 0 1
At their discretion national authorities may use the 10% category for claims on domestic public-sector entities.' 0 In the 20% category are claims with less than a one year maturity on banks outside
the OECD and claims on OECD banks or guaranteed by OECD
banks regardless of maturity.10 3 Also included are cash items in the
process of collection, 0 4 claims on public sector entities in OECD
countries, claims on multilateral development banks, 0 5 and claims
collateralized by securities of these banks.
The 50% risk-weight category includes mortgages on residential
property that will be occupied by the borrower or rented to another
person.' All other assets are included in the 100% category. The
100% group includes all claims on the private sector, interbank
loans with maturities greater than one year to non-OECD banks,'
and claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector. 0 8
Third, the guidelines require that regulators account for off-balance sheet activities within risk-weighted assets. 0 9 To perform this
accounting, off-balance sheet activities are multiplied by a conversion factor to obtain an asset figure." 0 This figure is then assigned to
one of the risk-weight percentage categories defined above.
Similar to risk-weight percentage categories, the Basle guidelines establish conversion factor categories for off-balance sheet activities. Direct credit substitutes are within the 100% conversion factor category. This category includes general guarantees, standby
letters of credit,"' and asset sales with recourse." 2 Within the 50%
conversion factor category are transaction-related contingencies,
such as performance bonds and bid bonds, 1 as well as commitments, such as the undrawn portion of a revolving line of credit with
tary Fund (IMF).
100. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 148.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 152.
103. Id. at 148. The Basle Committee believed banks located in an OECD member
nation presented less credit risk and, therefore, did not place a maturity limitation on these
banks, unlike banks located in nations outside the OECD.
104. Id. at 152.
105. Multilateral development banks include the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Development Bank.
106. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 148.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 149.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.at 153.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 149.
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a maturity greater than one year. 1 4 Finally, within the 20% conversion factor are short-term, self-liquidating trade-related contingencies arising from the movement of goods, such as documentary credits collateralized by the underlying shipment (e.g., letters of
credit). 11 5 Commitments that have a maturity of less than one year
or that can be unconditionally canceled at any time, are within the
1 16
0% conversion factor group.
The Basle Committee's guidelines establish a method for converting interest rate and foreign exchange items to risk-weighted assets. At the discretion of the national regulatory authority, interest
rate and foreign exchange related items can be accounted for by two
methods: the mark to market method 1 7 or the original exposure
method. 1 8
Once the assets have been assigned to risk-weight percentage
categories, and off-balance sheet activities have been accounted for,
banks must maintain the minimum capital level set by the Basle
Committee, the fourth component of the capital standards. 19 The
Committee set 8 % of risk-adjusted assets as the common minimum
capital level of banks. 1 0 The minimum level of Tier I capital is 4%
of risk-adjusted assets. Within Tier I capital, the loan loss reserves
component cannot account for more than 1.25 % of risk-weighted assets. In addition, Tier 2 capital cannot be greater than Tier I capital.
The subordinated debt component of Tier 2 capital cannot be greater
than 50% of the bank's Tier I capital.' 1
Realizing that the new risk-based capital guidelines would place
extra demands on some banks, the Committee provided for a transitional period for the implementation of the final 8 % standard."' By
December 31, 1990, banks must attain a 7.25% capital-to-riskweighted assets ratio with 3.625% of that ratio being Tier I capital.
During the interim period, 10% of Tier 1 capital may consist of Tier
2 capital elements, 121 . while loan loss reserves may account for up to
1 24
1.5% of risk-weighted assets.
114. Id. at 149.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The mark to market method calculates the replacement cost of the foreign exchange or interest rate contract. The majority of the Basle Committee, including the U.S.,
favored adoption of this method. Id. at 153-54.
118. The original exposure method, a simpler method, requires application of set conversion factors to the interest rate and foreign exchange contracts. Id. at 154.
119. Id.at 150.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. After January I, 1993, the loan loss reserves can only equal 1.25% of riskadjusted assets.
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Implementation of the Basle Capital Standards
Legal Status of the Capital Standards

The Basle Committee's capital guidelines are neither legally enforceable as a treaty 25 nor do they have legal force by themselves.
Rather, the separate national governments are charged with their
implementation. 12 Each signatory nation has committed itself to follow the guidelines in good faith 11 7 and has begun to implement the
capital standards, largely abiding by the tenets of the Committee's
guidelines."2 The Basle guidelines have improved upon past capital
adequacy regulations because they differentiate between risk levels,
consider off-balance sheet activities, minimize disincentives to hold
low risk assets, and provide for greater consistency in capital requirements among international banks. 29
B.

Current Implementation

Regulators have begun to implement the final standards in order to meet the deadline for implementation at the end of 1992. The
Basle Committee and national regulators consider the 8 % minimum
capital requirement to be just that-a minimum. 30 Because the capital guidelines do not take into account all the risks associated with
banking,' regulators expect banks to maintain capital levels significantly above the 8 % minimum. In the United States, bank regulators have stated that if banks wish to expand or to engage in risky
activities, they must maintain a capital ratio above the minimum
level;132 thus, regulators are likely to encourage banks to maintain
3
higher capital ratios.1
Despite the good faith efforts of the signatory nations' bank reg125. GAO, supra note 25, at 3.
126. Kindel & Barrett, Super Bank, FINANCIAL WORLD, March 5, 1991, at 28 [hereinafter Kindel).
127. Note, The Basle Accord: An Opportunity for Expanding BHC Securities Activities, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 559 (1989) [hereinafter Accord].
128. GAO, supra note 25, at 13.
129. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 10A; see supra notes 43-68 and accompanying text
on past capital adequacy regulations.
130. GAO, supra note 25, at 22.
131. These other risks include interest rate risks, foreign exchange risks, operational
risks, and fiduciary risks. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 13.
132. GAO, supra note 25, at 22. With the passage of the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, capital levels take an even greater role in the regulation of U.S. banks. Pub. L. 102-242,
105 Stat, 2236 (1991).
133. Petty, The Impact of Complying with Risk-based Capital, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 50-51. Japanese banks have announced that they will maintain a 9%
risk-based capital ratio. Top Japan Banks Set Risk Ratios Above BIS Standard, The Reuters
Library Report (April 9, 1991) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file). Federal Reserve Board Governor Wayne Angell stated recently that banks in the U.S. should eventually attain risk-based
capital ratios of 10% to 12%. Risk-based Capital, BNA's Banking Daily, March 31, 1992, at
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ulators and the improvements made by the Basle Committee's standards over previous attempts at bank capital regulation, the success
and effectiveness of the standards will depend upon their implementation by the individual national banking regulatory authorities.
However, the standards themselves give national regulators some discretion in implementation."" Some regulators are already utilizing
this control to their domestic banks' advantage.
C. Implementation in the United States
Bank regulators in the United States have expanded the application of the Basle Committee's capital guidelines to include all
banks, not just international banks as the Basle Committee intended.13 5 Application to all banks in the United States is not appro36
priate because the U.S. has a unique dual bank regulatory system.1
Money center banks have wider geographic risks than community
banks. The composition of the asset portfolios of the two types of
banks is completely different. Blanket application of the Basle Committee's capital standards to all banks ignores these differences.1"7
The Basle Committee intended the standards to apply to parent
companies only if the parent company was a bank. 38 Federal Reserve regulations apply the Basle Committee's standards, with some
changes to the definition of capital, to all bank holding companies
(BHCs). 3 9 Generally, Tier 1 capital includes common equity, retained earnings, noncumulative preferred stock, and minority equity
interests in consolidated subsidiaries." 0 For BHCs, the Federal Reserve regulations include cumulative preferred shares in Tier 1 capital up to a maximum limit of 25% of Tier 1 capital,"" with the
42
remainder of cumulative preferred being applied to Tier 2 capital.1
The Basle Committee's standards allowed only noncumulative preferred in Tier I capital, not cumulative preferred. This change in the
capital definition favors U.S. banks by allowing a new source of cap134. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 144 (para. 6).
135. Norton, supra note 20, at 282.
136. Watt, Paradox: New Leverage Rule Reduces Capital Standards, Amer. Banker,
Oct. 22, 1990, at 5-6.
137. Id.
138. Puleo, supra note 53, at 466.
139. Id. Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-based Capital
Measure, 12 C.F.R. § 208.127 (Pt. 208, App. A) (1991).
140. Puleo, supra note 53, at 469. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 144-45.
141. Puleo, supra note 53, at 469; 12 C.F.R. § 225.145 (Pt. 225, App. A) (1991). With
cumulative preferred stock, unpaid dividends accumulate and become liabilities of the corporation. Unpaid dividends of non-cumulative preferred stock do not become liabilities.
The Bush Administration in October 1991 issued a proposal that would raise the 25%
limit on the amount of preferred shares to be included in Tier I capital of BHC. Basel Loophole to Allow US Banks to Raise Capital, Boost Lending, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Oct. 11, 1991, at 1.
142. Puleo, supra note 53, at 469.
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ital into Tier I capital. Since foreign banks consider U.S. BHCs,
rather than individual bank subsidiaries of BHCs, to be the operating business unit, 4 ' the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB's) definition
of BHC capital should follow the Basle Committee's capital definition strictly rather than relaxing the definition of core capital.
One weakness of the guidelines is the loose definition of Tier 2
capital which allows national regulators to include various forms of
quasi-equity in their individual definition of bank capital.'" In contrast, the strict definition of Tier I capital allows it to serve as a
consistent capital comparison among international banks.' 4 5 As previously discussed, U.S. regulators weakened the strict Tier 1 capital
definition by allowing BHCs in the U.S. to include both cumulative
and non-cumulative preferred shares in Tier 1 capital.' 46 The three
federal bank regulatory agencies created two sets of capital adequacy rules-one for state banks and one for BHCs. 1 7 These regulations allowed BHCs to meet the Basle Committee capital ratios more
easily.
Using year-end 1989 data and the FRB's definition of bank capital, only three BHCs of the top fifty would not meet the Basle Committee's ratio.' " ' If the more strict definition was applied, twelve of
the top fifty BHCs would not meet the Basle ratios. 4 9 Furthermore,
these twelve BHCs control just under 50% of the assets of the top
fifty BHCs.1 5 ° Some commentators argue that these differences in
the capital definition are necessary because BHCs represent corporate structures unique to the U.S. This argument is not sound because similar corporate structures exist in other nations.' 5 '
U.S. bank regulators have differentiated the application of the
Basle Committee's guidelines to state banks and BHCs in other
ways. Certain hybrid debt/equity instruments included in a bank's
Tier 2 capital under the Basle standards can also be included in the
Tier 1 capital of a BHC under the FRB regulations. 52 BHCs must
fully deduct goodwill acquired after March 12, 1988, from Tier 1
capital, but may include goodwill acquired before that date in Tier 1
143. Alexander, A Question of Semantics, THE BANKER. Dec., 1991, at 15-16.
144. Id. at 15.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 14. See also Mitchell, Revisiting Risk-based Capital Guidelines, NEW
YORK L.J., March 27, 1991, at 3.
147. Alexander, supra note 143, at 14.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id.
150. Id. The money center banks are the banks most affected by this change of the
definition of bank capital.
151'. Id. Compagnie Financiere de Paribas in France is a holding company with three
distinct companies. The merger of ABN Bank and Amro Bank created a holding company in
the Netherlands.
152. 12 C.F.R. § 225.145 (Pt. 225, App. A) (1991). See also Accord, supra note 127, at
563-64; Norton, supra note 20, at 280.
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capital until the end of the transition period in 1992. Sa Under the
regulations, the FRB can exclude the investment in and assets of an
unconsolidated subsidiary of a BHC on a case-by-case basis. 5 4 If the
FRB orders the deduction of the investment, half will be from Tier I
55
capital and half will be from Tier 2 capital.
U.S. regulators have promulgated a separate set of capital adequacy rules to operate concurrently with the Basle guidelines. In addition, U.S. regulators require banks to maintain a minimum leverage ratio of 3 % .15 This ratio measures equity against total assets,
not risk-weighted assets. The objective is to ensure that banks with
low credit risks will, nevertheless, maintain a minimum level of capital to protect against other types of risk.' 57 Nearly all banks meet
this minimum leverage ratio, 58 but regulators frequently require a
higher leverage ratio depending on the financial condition of the par59
ticular bank.
D.

Implementation in Europe and the EC

Other nations have begun to change their banking laws to conform with the Basle Committee's standards. Switzerland and the
United Kingdom, like the U.S., formally changed their banking regulations. The Swiss Federal Council required all Swiss banks to meet
the new capital requirement by December 31, 1989.110 In October
1988 the Bank of England issued notice that all United Kingdom
banks must comply with the capital standards by December 31,
1989.1"1 France and Germany did not formally change their banking
regulations, but rather reached agreements with each of their internationally active banks." 2 Japan implemented the Basle Committee's standards through ministerial notification and applied them
63
only to banks with establishments overseas.'
153. 12 C.F.R. § 225.145 (Pt. 225, App. A) (1991). See also Accord, supra note 127, at
563-64.
154. 12 C.F.R. § 225.145 (Pt. 225, App. A) (1991). See also Accord, supra note 127, at
563-564.
155. Puleo, supra note 53, at 473.
156. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 10A.
157. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 74. A concern in developing the leverage ratio
was that if the ratio was too high it would "destroy risk reduction incentives of a risk-based
system." Id. at 13. Too high a ratio would run counter to the objectives of the Basle risk-based
capital scheme.
158. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 10A.
159. M. Feldstein, Revise Bank Capital Standards Now, Wall St. J., March 6, 1992, at
A8. Feldstein advocates a return to a uniform 3% ratio now that the Basle standards are in
effect.
160. GAO, supra note 25, at 14. See also PRICE WATERHOUSE, BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CAPITAL CONVERGENCE (1991). This survey details regulatory changes made by
various national governments as they implement the new capital standards.
161. GAO, supra note 25, at 14.
162. Id.
163. Id. Japanese banks without international offices can choose whether to follow the
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The European Community (EC) implemented the Basle Committee's standards through two capital adequacy directives issued by
the Council of Ministers in 1988: the Own Funds Directive and the
Solvency Ratio Directive."' An EC directive creates a general binding obligation upon member states, but it leaves to each state the
means by which to fulfill the obligation.1 1 5 Member states were required to comply with the Solvency Ratio Directive provisions by
January 1, 1991.66 The Solvency Ratio Directive, like the Basle
Committee's capital standards, focuses on credit risk; meanwhile, another directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive, focuses on market
risk.16 7 The Solvency Ratio Directive applies to all credit institutions
and requires bank capital to be equal to 8 % of risk-weighted assets.
The formula is:
solvency
ratio

=

own funds
risk-adjusted + off-balance
assets
sheet items

The directive applies five risk-weight categories: 0%, 10%,
20%, 50%, and 100%.118 The EC granted an important exception
to the implementation of the final guidelines to banks in Germany,
Denmark, and Greece. Bank mortgages on commercial property in
those countries are assigned to the 50% risk-weight category (rather
than 100%) until January 1, 1996, provided that the loan does not
exceed more than 60% of the financed property's value. 9 Other EC
countries must apply the 100% risk-weight to these loans. Thus, the
German, Danish, and Greek banks temporarily have a significant
competitive advantage over other banks. The reason for the exception is the great number of institutions that grant mortgaged-backed
loans in those nations; this exception allows them extra time for
Basle capital ratios. As of August 1990, ninety-one Japanese banks follow the Basle guidelines;
sixty-four banks follow domestic regulations. Id.
164. Norton, supra note 20, at 295. Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions, 89/647/EEC, O.J. (No. L 386) 14 (1989); Council Directive of 17 Apr. 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 89/299/EEC, O.J. (No. L 124)
16 (1989). See also Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 143-44.
In a related development, the Council issued a Second Banking Directive on December
15, 1989, that creates a uniform banking license within EC member states. 89/646/EEC, O.J.
(no. L 386) 1 (1989). See generally Gruson & Feuring, The New Banking Law of the European Economic Community, 25 INT'L LAW. I (1991) [hereinafter Gruson].
165. Norton, supra note 20, at 285. See Treaty of Rome, art. 189.
166. Gruson, supra note 164, at 28.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 29. The U.S. regulations only apply four risk-weight percentage categories
even though the Basle guidelines contemplate using five categories.
169. Solvency Ratio Directive, art. 11(4); Gruson, supra note 164, at 29. In the U.S.,
the OCC and the Department of Treasury are considering a policy of reclassifying commercial
loans as residential loans thus requiring banks to maintain less capital. Dawson, U.S. Bank
Regulators Review Easing Capital Standards, The Reuters library Report (Oct. 3, 1991)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
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transition. 7 '
The Own Funds Directive establishes a laundry list of elements
of capital from which member states can choose to include in their
definition of bank capital.1 71 The structure of the Directive allows
member states the opportunity to influence the competitive position
of their credit institutions by selecting a favorable mix of these
1 72
elements.
The directive labels Tier I capital as original own funds and
Tier 2 capital as additional own funds.' 73 The directive lists loan loss
reserves or funds for general banking risks as an element of either
Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital may include loan loss
reserves, but loan loss reserves will not contribute towards the sum of
capital setting the maximum limit of Tier 2 capital. 74 This difference from the Basle Committee's standards regarding the application of loan loss reserves is only temporary because the Commission
will be issuing a report that will recommend whether to assign loan
loss reserves to Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital.' 75 Furthermore, excessive
as capital would detrimentally affect the
use of loan loss reserves
176
banks' credit rating.
In essence, the EC directives follow the Basle Committee's standards, but allow EC Member States the opportunity to manipulate
the definition of bank capital at the margin. EC national bank regulators may use this flexibility in a manner advantageous to their individual domestic banking institutions. Because not all Member States
have passed enabling legislation, the complete effect of the directives
is currently not apparent.
E.

Other Issues Regarding Implementation

Differences in implementation by signatory nations has weakened the objective of competitive equality sought by the Basle Committee. One contentious issue is which reserves are included in Tier 2
capital. 7 7 Some bank regulators do not consider loan loss reserves to
be capital. Banks incorporated in nations without a liberal Tier 2
capital definition may be at a competitive disadvantage. 78 Consolidation of bank subsidiaries raises another contentious issue. The Basle Committee intended that nations would apply the ratios on a con170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Gruson, supra note 164, at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GAO, supra note 25, at 26-27.
Id.
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solidated basis. 17 9 Some nations apply the ratios on this basis, but
others do not. 180
Nations have made various policy choices in implementing the
guidelines. The EC directives appear to require more bank capital
than the Basle Committee's guidelines require."'1 In contrast, the
Japanese government changed financial regulations to allow Japanese banks to meet the Basle capital ratios.' 8 2 The Japanese government abandoned restrictions on the issuance of convertible bonds,
created a subordinated loan market, and created a securitized loan
market. 8 3 In the U.S. the Federal Reserve requires BHCs to deduct
their investment in securities subsidiaries. In contrast, European regulators allow banks to participate in these activities. 184 In the U.S.,
the capital in a bank subsidiary does not count towards the Basle
Committee's capital ratio, but in Europe it does. 85
Differences in accounting rules create other variations in implementation of the capital ratios. In the United Kingdom some banks
use doubtful property revaluations to increase capital. 8 ' In France,
the banks use share swaps with other banks to increase their capital. 87 Finally, various signatory governments are taking advantage
of the leeway provided for in the Basle Committee's standards by
assigning assets to the lowest acceptable risk-weight category. 1 88
Other nations are applying the Basle ratios to all banks when it was
intended that the ratios apply only to international banks.' 89 Banks
not subject to the Basle Committee's capital guidelines have a competitive advantage over banks subject to the guidelines, such as U.S.
domestic banks, because they need not maintain the same stringent
level of capital.
F.

Implementation in Japan
Banks in different nations will have different burdens in imple-

179. Id.
180. The Federal Reserve gives BHCs a more liberal definition of capital. See supra
notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
181. GAO, supra note 25, at 16.
182. Id. at 14.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Rideout, U.S. Banks Need New Rules to Win on Global Ballfield, Amer. Banker,
March 15, 1990, at 12.
185. Id.
186. Europe's Reluctant Superbanks, The Economist, Jan. 5, 1991, at 59 [hereinafter
Europe's]. See also Premises, Premises, THE BANKER, Oct. 1991, at 20. "[Tlhere's now a
growing debate over whether the potential sale value of these assets [the bank's real property]
should be included as part of a bank's capital base . . ." Id.
187. Id. French banks have an additional handicap in that most are nationalized and do
not have ready access to capital markets. They cannot sell additional shares but must ask the
French government for additional capital. "
188. Friesen, International Competitive Consequences of Capital Guidelines, Amer.
Banker, Feb. 26, 1991, at 13A.
189. Id.
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menting the Basle Committee's capital guidelines. The inclusion of
hidden reserves as part of bank capital will probably help countries
such as Japan and Germany whose banks have a substantial amount
of these reserves. 190 Although Japanese members of the Basle Committee proposed that Tier 2 capital include the value of hidden
reserves1 9 1 and the Basle Committee accepted their proposal, it limited inclusion of hidden reserves to 45% of their value.' 92 The
Nomura Research Institute estimated that in July 1988, before the
big decline in the value of the Tokyo stock market, 45 % of hidden
reserves equaled 6% of the risk-weighted assets of Japanese city
banks and 9% of risk-weighted assets of long-term credit banks.'9 3
Thus, Japanese banks relied heavily on their hidden reserves in order
to meet the Basle Committee standards.
When regulating Japanese banks, the Japanese Ministry of Finance will only check risk-based capital on March 31st of each year,
the end of the fiscal year for Japanese corporations."9 Analysts expect bank assets to drop at this time because Japanese corporations
will reduce their debt to dress up their balance sheets. 195 Prior to
March 31st each year, banks will sell dollars to decrease the value19of6
dollar-denominated assets and, therefore, boost their capital ratio.
Furthermore, 40% of bank assets are held in foreign currencies;
therefore, any drop in the value of foreign currency will reduce the
value of bank assets. 97 Also, Japanese banks have fewer riskweighted assets because they hold fewer off-balance sheet items than
other international banks.19 8 This once-a-year evaluation of capital
levels and a generally lower amount of risk-weighted assets may give
Japanese banks a competitive advantage over other banks after the
Basle Committee's standards are implemented at the end of 1992.
Just as the Japanese regulators choose when to enforce the standards, different national regulators can resolve other issues to favor
their domestic banks. The Basle Committee left to the discretion of
national regulators whether crossholdings in other banks should
190. Note, The Proposed Risk-based Capital Framework: A Model of International
Banking Cooperation?, I I FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 777, 792 (1988) [hereinafter Model]. Hidden
reserves are accumulated, after-tax retained earnings not disclosed on a bank's balance sheet.
191. Osborn & Evans, Cooke's Medicine: Kill or Cure? EUROMONEY, July 1988, at 40
[hereinafter Osborn].
192. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 145.
193. Osborn, supra note 191, at 40.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. A decrease in the value of the dollar relative to the yen will decrease the yen
value of dollar-denominated assets. If yen-denominated capital remains the same, the capital
ratio increases.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 44. Letters of credit and loan commitments are examples of off-balance sheet
items with a 50% conversion factor that are now accounted for under the Basle guidelines.
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count as bank capital.199 Among Japanese banks, these crossholdings
are significant.2"' By including crossholdings within bank capital,
regulators have the opportunity to boost bank capital of domestic
banks and give them a competitive advantage. The Basle Committee
also gave national regulators discretion in assigning governmentbacked securities to risk-weight categories."' Although the Basle
Committee thought that this discretion would have a minor impact
on the effectiveness of the guidelines, regulators can use the discretion to benefit domestic banks.2 02 It is likely that the Japanese Ministry of Finance will assign these assets to the lowest risk category,
0%, while the Federal Reserve has already assigned similar assets to
the 20% risk category, thus, requiring more capital support from
2

U.S. banks.

0 3

V.

Implications

A.

Banks Generally In Compliance

At the end of 1990, 78 % of United States' largest 300 commercial banks met the 1992 Basle Committee's capital standards, 20 4 as
did ninety-two of the top one hundred U.S. BHC.2 05 While most
U.S. banks have complied.with the new capital standards, a significant portion are not yet in compliance. Problem loans resulting in
increases to loan loss reserves and weak earnings have hindered
banks' abilities to improve their capital ratios.2 06 According to an
earlier estimate, as of March 1990, 562 U.S. banks holding approximately 36% of total bank assets had not achieved the 1992 Basle
Committee's standards. The banks that had not met these standards
needed an additional $24 billion in capital in order to meet the
standards. 7
Similarly, in Japan two of the largest fifteen international banks
had not met the 1992 Basle Committee's standard as of March
1991.208 This is a dramatic improvement over the situation in September 1990, when only one of the big Japanese city banks reached
199. Id. at 40; Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 146 (para. 25-27).
200. Osborn, supra note 191, at 40.
201. Id.
202. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 144 (para. 6).
203. Osborn, supra note 191, at 40.
204. Lipin & Horowitz, 78% of Big Banks Meet '92 Capital Rules, Amer. Banker,
March 28, 1991, at 1.96.4% of all U.S. commercial banks met the Basle standards as of June
30, 1990. See also GAO, supra note 25, at 16.
205. Holland, Capital Ratios Shrank at Half of Top Banks, Amer. Banker, April 18,
1991, at 1.
206. Id.
207. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 12.
208. Top Japan Banks Set Risk Ratios Above BIS Standard, The Reuters Library Report (April 9, 1991) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
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the 8 % minimum capital requirement.26 9 However, the number of
Japanese banks out of compliance could increase dramatically because of fluctuations in the value of the Tokyo stock market. Since
Japanese banks have relied heavily on hidden reserves to attain the
Basle Committee's capital ratio, they are very susceptible to stock
market movements.2 10 The penalties for not attaining the capital ratio by March 1993211 may be severe for Japanese banks. Credit rating agencies may downgrade the banks' credit ratings and, thereby,
cause an increase in the banks' cost of capital.2 12 The Bank of Japan
may issue some harsh guidance and constrain the banks' growth.
Foreign bank regulators may not let the banks pursue new foreign
business until they increase their capital.2 1 3 Bank regulators and
credit rating agencies in other countries would probably act in the
same or similar manner with respect to their domestic banks.
B. Industry Structure and Bank Policies Change Because of
Standards
To avoid these adverse consequences, banks have changed and
will continue to change their business policies and strategies in order
to enable them to comply with the Basle capital standards. The standards themselves have caused a restructuring of the banking industry into capital haves and have-nots.
Already, a tiering has occurred among banks according to their
respective capital levels. 2 ' Banks with adequate or excess capital are
able to raise additional capital at advantageous rates and are able to
take advantage of the resulting wider margins between loans and
bank capital.21 5 The Basle Committee's capital requirements have
accentuated this situation. 1 Well-capitalized institutions will be
able to expand their business with new products and new geographic
locations at the expense of their poorly capitalized competitors.2 17 As
209. Europe's, supra note 186, at 59.
210. Alexander, Black September, THE BANKER, Nov. 1990, at 110. A one thousand
point move in the Nikkei stock index equals approximately a 0.2% change in the typical
bank's capital ratio. Ratios, supra note 208. Likewise, a ten yen move in the dollar-yen exchange rate equals approximately a 0.2% change in a bank's capital ratio. Id.
The Basle Committee resisted the inclusion of hidden reserves in Tier 2 capital because of
the volatility of its value. Alexander, Black September, THE BANKER, Nov. 1990, at 110. The
events of 1990-92 in the Tokyo stock market support the Committee's skepticism.
211. Japanese banks are given an extra three months to attain the final 1992 capital
standards.
212. Japan Stock Market Fall Threatens Banks' Capital Ratios, The Reuters library
Report (Aug. 9, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
213. Id.
214. Fairlamb, How the Capital Quest is Reshaping Banking, INsTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, March 1991, at 59.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Friesen, supra note 188, at 14A.
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poorly capitalized institutions sell assets to boost their capital ratios,
the well-capitalized institutions will be able to buy these assets at
advantageous prices.218
In 1987 United States banks had capital requirements equal to
approximately 6% of assets.2 19 The Basle Committee's standards require banks to maintain an 8 % capital requirement. Furthermore, in
the past, banks could include goodwill and loan loss reserves in their
calculation of capital.22 0 Under the Basle standards, goodwill is not
considered capital and loan loss reserves can be applied to the capital
account to a maximum amount equal to 1.25 % of risk-weighted assets." 1 Loan loss reserves in the past accounted for most of the
banks' capital requirements.22 2 Now, banks can no longer rely on
loan loss reserves to fulfill their regulatory capital requirements and
will use one of the methods described above to raise capital.
The Basle Committee's capital guidelines are likely to cause significant changes in various bank policies. In short, to meet the guidelines, banks must raise capital or sell assets. To raise capital, banks
may manipulate their financial statements. The limitation of loan
loss reserves as a component of bank-capital to 1.5 %, then 1.25 % of
risk-adjusted assets may discourage banks from increasing reserves
against possible loan losses. 22 3 Banks currently hold loan loss reserves
equal to approximately 4% of assets. 22 4' Holding such high loan loss
reserves, when only an amount equal to 1.25% of risk-adjusted assets will count toward capital, is an expensive use of funds. Therefore, banks may apply funds to retained earnings that they otherwise
would have applied to loan loss reserves.
C. Banks Forced to Raise Capital
Banks will attempt to raise capital by issuing new debt or equity, but current market conditions will make both of these options
expensive. 22 Banks will issue more subordinated debt because it may
be included in Tier 2 capital. 226 The disadvantage of subordinated
debt over equity is that bank operating income is decreased by the
interest charges on the debt. 27 In the past, banks have raised subor218. Watt, supra note 136, at 5-6.
219. Nash, Twelve Countries Want Banks to Increase Capital, N.Y. Times, Dec. I1,
1987, at AI, col. 2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 11.
223. Osborn, supra note 191, at 51.
224. Id.
225. Mitchell, Coping with the New Capital Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1991, at 14.
226. GAO, supra note 25, at 15-16. Subordinated debt must have a maturity of over five
years, must be amortized during its last five years, and cannot be more than 50% of Tier I
capital.
227. Little, Capital Adequacy: The Benchmark of the 1990's, THE BANKERS MAGA-
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dinated debt by placing it privately with Japanese investors, but
under the current market climate, this is no longer possible. 2 In the
fall of 1990, Japanese banks issued nearly $4 billion worth of subordinated debt.229 Japanese insurance companies purchased most of
these issues by selling securities on the Tokyo stock market which
further exacerbated the capital problems of the Japanese banks by
driving down the value of the banks' stock portfolios.23 0
As the above example of Japanese banks scrambling for new
capital illustrates, the capital regulations are flawed because they do
not identify new sources of capital for banks.2 3 1 Financial institutions, lacking access to capital markets, issued capital in 1990 at half
the rate of 1989.232 In the current market, investors do not wish to
buy equity, preferred stock, or subordinated debt. They are willing to
purchase senior debt, but this type of debt does not count as Tier 1
or Tier 2 capital.2 3 Despite poor market conditions, banks have relied on the issuance of subordinated debt and perpetual preferred
stock to bolster bank capital.23 4
Another technique used to increase capital is to issue hybrid
debt instruments. 2 3

5

With the current weakness of the equity mar-

kets, banks are relying on debt-type instruments to meet the new
standards.2 3

This method is fine when the market value of shares is

increasing and earnings are rising, but can create significant risks if
the economy enters a recession.23 7
In addition, there has been an attempt to issue new preferred
shares, but market conditions require a high rate of return on any
new issue.23 8 The Basle Committee's guidelines do not place any
limit on the amount of non-cumulative preferred shares in Tier I
capital, but these shares are difficult to sell, principally because of
Jan-Feb. 1990, at 16-17.
228. Lewis & Marsh, Too Many Hungry Mouths to Feed, EUROMONEY. Dec. 1990, at
37 [hereinafter Lewis].
229. Alexander, supra note 210, at I ll. Sumitomo issued $700 million of subordinated
debt on July 12, 1990; Mitsui Taiyo Kobe issued $1 billion on Sept. 5-6, 1990. Soon thereafter, Bank of Tokyo issued $800 million; Fuji issued $700 million; Nippon Credit issued $500
million; and other Japanese banks issued $1 billion more by September 31st. Id.
230. Id.
231. L. BRYAN, supra note 4, at 58-59.
232. Cahouet, Managing for Capital Conservation as Markets Get Tighter, Amer.
Banker, Feb. 26, 1991, at 14A. In 1987, banks in the U.S. issued approximately $18 billion of
stocks and bonds; in 1988 banks issued $13 billion; in 1989 banks issued $15 billion; and in the
first nine months of 1990, banks issued $6 billion. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Vardon, Opponent's View: The Wrong Side of Regulatory Capital Rules, Amer.
Banker, Feb. 26, 1991, at 7A.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Mitchell, supra note 225, at 14.
ZINE.
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their non-cumulative feature." 9 Furthermore, some nations' laws do
not allow the issuance of perpetual, non-cumulative preferred
shares. 40 The United States is currently the only significant market
" '
for these types of shares.24
The Basle guidelines may encourage more banks, at least in the
United States, to use employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) as a
source of capital.2 42 These plans allow employees to purchase stock
of the bank. ESOPs are a limited source of additional capital for
banks because the number of employees who provide the capital is
limited. An ESOP enhances stock growth and benefits employees,2 " '
but, on the downside, it dilutes current shareholder voting power.
Also, an ESOP requires financing to purchase the shares. A bank in
need of capital may find it difficult to obtain financing for an
24 4
ESOP.

The Basle Committee's guidelines may also encourage banks,
especially those in Europe, to hold assets and capital in several different currencies. Fluctuations in currency values may increase assets and, thus, lower the value of a bank's capital ratio. 245 This

change in value caused by currency fluctuations occurs principally
when bank capital is held in only one currency.24 To compensate for
this uncertainty, banks may issue capital in several different
currencies.24 7
D. Industry Consolidation Discouraged
The most dramatic way for a bank to increase its capital ratio is
to merge with another bank and slash non-interest expenses. 48 Ironically, the Basle Committee's capital standards may discourage mergers and the consolidation of the banking industry in the United
States and in Europe. According to the guidelines, all goodwill (usually generated from bank acquisitions) must be deducted from Tier 1
capital. 249 Because financial institutions must deduct goodwill from
239. Banks Face Tough Times Raising Capital for BIS, The Reuters Library Report
(March 7, 1991) (LExIs, Nexis library, Omni file). With non-cumulative preferred shares,
dividends not paid currently do not accumulate and need never be paid by the corporation.
240. Lewis, supra note 228, at 34.
241. Id. See also Kantowitz, It Looks Like Equity but Feels Like Debt, EUROMONEY,
May 1991, at 42 (Supp.).
242. Cahouet, supra note 232, at 14A-15A.
243. Little, supra note 227, at 17.
244.

Id.

245.

Osborn, supra note 191, at 52.

246.

Id.

247. Id: See also Kantowitz, supra note 241, at 44. Preferred shares in U.S. dollars
serve as a hedge to fluctuations in the value of dollar-denominated assets.
248. Fairlamb, supra note 214, at 60.
249. Puleo, supra note 53, at 472. The Federal Reserve has created a grandfather exception for goodwill acquired before March 12, 1988, and for goodwill obtained from the acquisition of a troubled depository institution. Id.
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Tier I capital, acquisitions using the purchase accounting method25 0
will become more costly; 251 therefore, offer prices may decline be-

cause the market is relatively smaller. 252 Stock-for-stock acquisitions
are still possible, but the potential shareholder dilution if the parties'
price-earnings ratio differ makes these. transactions less attractive. 253
E. Securitization Encouraged
Given the current market conditions, new capital issues alone
will not enable banks to attain the Basle Committee's standards. Decreasing assets by sale or securitization will be necessary.2

54

It is

255
likely that there will be an increase in the securitization of assets;

in fact, securitization is already increasing dramatically. 256 In 1989,

$25.2 billion of securitization deals occurred. In the first nine months
of 1990, $33 billion of these deals were closed. 5 7 By utilizing this
technique, a bank removes assets off its balance sheet and does not
include them in its risk-weighted assets calculation. Securitization
expands the market of loan buyers allowing non-depository institutions such as insurance companies, pension funds, and individuals to
purchase mortgage loans.25 8 In addition, the bank can retain servicing rights on the securitized assets and, thus, generate fee income
without having to maintain capital in support of this line of
business.2 59
Securitization will change the composition of banks' loan portfo2 60
lios.

Banks will make more residential mortgages because they are

in a lower risk weight category (50%) than commercial loans
250.

Purchase accounting is a conservative method to account for the acquisition of a

target company because it forces the acquiror to restate the target's assets and liabilities to
market. Cahouet, supra note 232, at 15A.
251. Id.
252. Lipman, New Risk-based Capital Guidelines Will Change Banks' Future, 107
BANKING L.J. 4 (1990). See also Osborn, supra note 191, at 36. The goodwill rules will not
only discourage the acquisition of banks but may also discourage the acquisition of technologybased subsidiaries such as Citibank's purchase of Quotron. Osborn, supra note 191, at 48.
253. Osborn, supra note 191, at 48.

254. Lewis, supra note 228, at 39. By the end of 1991, Security Pacific plans to sell
10% of its $89 billion balance sheet to increase its Tier I capital ratio to 5%. Fairlamb, supra
note 214, at 58.
Securitization is the bundling and underwriting of loans into negotiable securities that are
tradable on the open market. See generally J. ROSENTHAL & J. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF
CREDIT (1988).
255. Orabutt, supra note 67, at 10A; see also Mitchell, supra note 213, at 15.
256. Lewis, supra note 228, at 36.
257. Id. See also Henriques, Rates Down, Offerings Up in One Note Category, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1991, at FI5. From January to June 1990, $13.7,billion of asset-backed securities were issued. In the same period in 1991, $19.1 billion of asset-backed securities were

issued. Id.
258.
259.
260.

Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 8-9.
Lewis, supra note 228, at 36.
Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 9.
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(100%).261 They are encouraged to bundle residential mortgages
into securities because these mortgage-backed securities have a lower
risk-weight than non-securitized residential mortgages.28 2 Ginnie
Mae securities are within the 0% risk-weight category; Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae securities are in the 20% risk-weight category." 3
Financial establishments generally will use the securitization
technique to convert high risk-weight assets to low risk-weight assets.2" 4 Likewise, foreign banks have the same incentive to securitize
assets.26 5 Banks may use the capital freed by securitizing assets to
support high risk, high yield loans because low risk, blue chip corporate customers seek financing in the commercial paper markets. 26 6 In
addition, if assets are not sold outright, asset growth will be strategically decreased (i.e., decrease of bank lending and closer scrutiny of
credit applicants).26 7
Banks in the U.S. must structure their asset sales carefully.
Under U.S. banking regulations, if the sales are with recourse or if
the banks retain any risk of loss, the assets are not taken off the
books for risk-based capital purposes.2 68 Ultimately, a sale of assets
is a short-term solution to the capital problems. In the long run, the
banks will lose their hard earned market share if they continue to
liquidate assets.26 9
261. Id.
262. Allen, Securitized Mortgages and Risk-based Capital, BANK ADMINISTRATION,
Feb. 1989, at 14.
263. Id. See also Norton, supra note 20, at 319.
All types of asset securitization will increase, such as consumer receivables, automobiles,
and mobile homes. These types of credit are good candidates for securitization because they
are of high quality and high liquidity. Petty, supra note 133, at 52.
Ginnie Mae securities are issued by the Government National Mortgage Association, a
corporation wholly owned by the U.S. government and located within the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Ginnie Mae securities are guaranteed by and carry the full
faith and credit backing of the U.S. government. Fannie Mae securities are issued by the
Federal National Mortgage Association and are not backed explicitly by the federal government. Freddie Mac securities, issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, are

similarly not explicitly backed by the U.S. government. See

THE FINANCIAL

ANALYST'S

HANDBOOK 946-48 (S. Levine ed., 2d. ed. 1988).

264. Lipman, supra note 252, at 4. Banks can use innovative techniques to enhance the
creditworthiness of securitized assets. When securitizing credit card receivables, banks can use
a spread account. In this account, the bank deposits in escrow the spread between the interest
paid on the securities and the higher interest paid on the assets underlying the securities. The
use of the spread account to enhance the creditworthiness of credit card receivables securities
was approved by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) on November 21, 1986. Puleo, supra note 53, at 489-90.
265. Osborn, supra note 191, at 44.
266. Capital Adequacy: Bringing Out the Tin Helmets, The Economist, Oct. 13, 1990,
at 88; see also Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 8-9. Large corporate customers have found in
recent years that issuing their own debt on the commercial paper markets is significantly less
expensive than borrowing funds from a commercial bank.
267. GAO, supra note 25, at 16.
268. Puleo, supra note 53, at 484. See also FFIEC 032 Glossary A-32 through A-35
reprinted in Puleo, supra note 53, at 544-50; FASB Technical Bulletin 85-2, Accounting for
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (March 18, 1985).
269. Mitchell, supra note 220, at 15. If banks continue to sell assets, employee morale
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Asset Portfolio Restructured

Because of the Basle Committee capital standards, banks will
likely restructure their asset portfolios. The institution of different
risk-weight categories for different assets requiring varying capital
investments has encouraged the banks' shuffling of assets. Banks are
swapping high risk-weight assets for low risk-weight assets.170 The
guidelines are flawed in that they do not match capital requirements
to loan quality. 7 1 For instance, all commercial loans require the
same amount of capital regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower-whether a blue chip corporation or a nearly bankrupt airline.
This regulatory structure, although simple, may have the unintended consequence of encouraging banks to book high risk, high
yield loans over low risk loans because the capital requirements for
these two types of loans are the same.2 7' The risk-weight categories
by their nature will encourage banks to favor a lower risk-weight
asset over a higher risk-weight asset even when there is no credit
quality difference between the two assets. For example, a bank may
choose a high yield revenue bond of a financially unstable city (risk
weight of 20%) over a commercial loan to a blue chip corporation
(risk weight of 100%).273
Competition between financial institutions in the market segments consisting of low risk-weight assets will increase resulting in
thinner margins.27' Residential mortgages will become more attractive than commercial loans. 75 Off-balance sheet activities, such as
lines of credit, will become more expensive because they require additional capital.2 76 Loans to other banks will become more attractive
because they require less capital (20% risk-weight category). 77
Banks will switch their 100% risk-weighted commercial mortgages
for lower risk-weighted Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae mortgagebacked securities.2 7 Loans to OECD governments require no addi2 79
tion to bank capital.
will decrease and the bank will not be able to maintain its position in the global banking
system. Osborn, supra note 191, at 47-48.
270. Mitchell, supra note 225, at 15.
271. Bryan, supra note 4, at 59.
272. GAO, supra note 25, at 25.
273. Model, supra note 190, at 791.
274. Boyle, Bankers See a Possible Shakeout in the Letter-of-Credit Business, The
Bond Buyer, April 26, 1990, at 8A.
275. Lipman, supra note 252, at 3-4. Bank lobbyists are attempting to change the regulations to allow some commercial mortgages to be included in the 50% weight category. Basel
Loopholes to Allow US Banks to Raise Capital, Boost Lending, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING
REGULATOR, Oct. II, 1991, at 1.
276. Id. at 4.
277. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 14.
278. Osborn, supra note 191, at 40. See supra note 263 for further information on Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac securities.
279. Basle Standards, supra note 2, at 147-48. Less creditworthy governments in the
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The regulators argue that differentiating credit risks to a finer
degree would make the guidelines unworkably complex. That reasoning is correct, but price controls generally are complex. These capital
guidelines act to a certain degree as price controls of banking products. 28 0 One long-term result of the standards for the banking industry will likely be that high quality assets will bypass the banking
system because capital requirements are too high for these assets. In
contrast, low quality assets will move into the banking system be8
cause capital requirements are too low for those assets.1 1
Furthermore, the capital standards do not distinguish between
banks.28 2 All must meet the 8% requirement even though some
banks are more financially secure than others. Some banks may need
more capital to keep operating; other well-managed banks may need
less. They will also have to change their portfolio management techniques because different assets will have to attain different returns in
order to generate the overall return on equity demanded by investors.28 Banks, particularly European banks, that hold shares in corporations will reevaluate their holdings to ensure that the invest2 4
ments are generating adequate returns on capital.
G.

Prices of Banking Products Increased

The Basle Committee's standards are affecting how bank managers price their products despite the fact that the Basle Committee
never intended for managers to use risk-weight categories in making
pricing and lending decisions.2 8 5 Fees on undrawn loans have risen
sharply.28 6 In addition, banks are less likely to participate in multiple
option facilities28 7 and other credit arrangements at the thin margins
charged in the late eighties. 8 8 Lending margins in general were increasing in 1991 because of the effect of the capital guidelines and
OECD, such as Belgium, Greece, and Portugal, will benefit by easier access to credit. Sesit,
New Bank Rules are Expected to Spur Volume on Global Securities Markets, Wall Street
Journal, July 17, 1991, at Cl.

Bryan, supra note 4, at 60.
Id. at 60. Some commentators would argue that a similar phenomenon happened in
the savings and loan industry in the early 1980's. See generally L, BRYAN. BREAKING UP THE
280.
281.

BANK (1988).

282. Bryan, supra note 4, at 59.
283. See generally Petty, supra note 133. The article provides a good discussion of the
different financial management techniques required under the new capital adequacy rules.
Banks will focus more resources on risk management so that they can channel resources
into less capital-intensive products. Fairlamb, supra note 209, at 59.
284. Osborn, supra note 191, at 54.
285. GAO, supra note 25, at 25.
286. Farrand, BIS Rules Force Banks to Raise Undrawn Loan Fees, The Reuters
Library Report (Aug. 13, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
287. Multiple option facilities (MOF) allow borrowers to obtain financing in several different forms (i.e., euronotes, U.S. dollar commercial paper, or bank bills) at the discretion of
the borrower. Id.
288.

Id.
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the less aggressive posture of Japanese banks which have been slowing their asset growth to meet the standards.28 9 Also, prices of loans
to non-OECD nations have increased because of the Basle standards.

290

Banks will likely increase the fees of their products result-

ing in a further loss of customers to other financial institutions which
are not subject to the Basle Committee's standards.2 9 '
H. Competitive and Cost Imbalances in the Financial Services Industry Created
The Basle Committee's standards will disadvantage banks relative to other financial institutions. While the guidelines create a level
playing field among international banks, they generally do the opposite with respect to the overall financial services market.2 92 While
banks change policies and decrease lending in order to meet the new
strict capital standards, other financial institutions can increase their
lending at a lower cost because they are not subject to the same
stringent capital requirements.29 Capital requirements are not the
only impediment to competitive equality among banks; the Basle
Committee did not attempt to address the numerous tax, accounting,
economic and regulatory differences between nations which create
inequalities among banks.294
The Basle Committee guidelines do not require banks to disclose their risk-based capital ratios. Nevertheless, some banks are
disclosing their ratios in order to advertise their financial strength.
During the interim period, some confusion will necessarily result un289.

Evans, Basic Loans Outshine Exotic Financing, Amer. Banker, April 16, 1991, at

24.
290. Hall, International Loan Risk Rules Haunt Post-war Gulf, The Reuters Library
Report (March 17, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). A loan to Saudi Arabia in February, 1991, was priced at fifty basis points above London Interbank Rate (LIBOR). A loan to
Kuwait would theoretically be one hundred points above LIBOR - a very high rate for a
country that was one of the nation's richest. Id.
The Basle standards place loans to governments and central banks of OECD and nonOECD countries in different risk weight categories. This difference will undoubtedly discourage non-OECD sovereign lending. Gulf nations complained about the difference in risk weight
category stating that the Government of Turkey, a member of the OECD, is not a better
credit risk than some of the oil-rich Gulf states which are not members of the OECD. The
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq illustrates the credit risk the Basle Committee recognized. Id.
In November 1991 the Arab Monetary Fund based in Abu Dhabi held a meeting to
consider responses to the Basle Committee's decision to place loans to most Arab nations in
the high risk category. Kawash, Arab States Consider Action on Basel Decision, Agence
France Presse (Nov. 15, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
291. Osborn, supra note 191, at 36. These institutions include insurance companies and
credit companies such as Ford Motor Credit Corporation and General Motors Acceptance
Corporation.
292. The Basle Committee is discussing this competitive inequality issue with securities
regulators currently. GAO, supra note 25, at 28.
293. Kindel, supra note 126, at 28.
294. GAO, supra note 25, at 30.
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til all nations implement the final 1992 standards. 29 Eventually, the
Basle ratios, particularly the Tier 1 capital ratio, will serve as a better comparison of financial strength of international banks for investors and analysts.2 9 6
The Basle guidelines impose additional costs on banks. Increased regulation generally is a burden on business and increases
their reporting costs. 297 More importantly, increased regulation also
focuses the banker's mind on regulation and away from the market
and servicing customers' needs.2 98 Under the Basle framework, regulators must assign new financial products to a risk category. 299 In the
past, banks generally dealt only with their national regulators. Now,
under the Basle Committee's standards, national regulators must get
the consensus of their international peers to change the standards.3"'
Likewise, banks must realize that they are in effect dealing with two
sets of regulators when it comes to capital requirements.
I.

Future Developments

In order for the Basle Committee's standards to achieve their
objectives, more nations must adopt the standards. Unless more nations adopt the principles underlying the standards, the banks located in the original twelve signatory nations will be at a competitive
disadvantage.30 1 Members of the Basle Committee are members of
other international forums and, therefore have the opportunity to
persuade other nations toward adoption. 0 2 The Council of Ministers
of the EC has issued directives that implement similar capital requirements.3 0 3 Because of these directives, five additional nations
have effectively adopted the Basle Committee's standards;3 0' several
nations, including Australia, Austria, New Zealand, Singapore, and
Bahrain, have voluntarily agreed to implement the standards in their
305
respective countries.
The Basle Committee continues to revise and to develop its cap295. Id. at 27-28.
296. Id. at 22.
297. Osborn, supra note 191, at 54.
298. Id.
299. GAO, supra note 25, at 25.
300. Puleo, supra note 53, at 464-65.
301. Note, supra note 190, at 793.
302. These other forums include the OECD, the SEANZA Forum of Bank Supervisors,
the Nordic Supervisory Group, and the Commission of Banking Supervisory and Regulatory
Administration Authorities of Latin America and the Caribbean. Id. at 794-95, nn. 134-35.
303. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
304. These five nations are the following: Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Denmark. They are members of the EC but not of the Basle Committee.
305. GAO, supra note 25, at 23. One report states that thirty-two nations have implemented bank capital guidelines similar to those in the Basle standards. Other nations are planning to implement similar standards. PRICE WATERHOUSE. BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND
CAPITAL CONVERGENCE (1991).
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ital standards. It is currently working on new position risk standards
for foreign exchange, equity and interest rate risk. 30 6 The interest
rate risk measure was tested during 1991.307 The Basle Committee is
also considering whether to set higher capital requirements for banks
and other financial conglomerates.30 8 Also, U.S. banking regulators
have stated that the 1992 capital ratios may not be sufficient and are
considering raising the capital requirements.30 This issue is still
evolving and will undoubtedly undergo future changes that will have
an equivalent, if not greater, impact on the banking industry.
VI.

Conclusion

The Basle Committee's standards improve on past attempts of
risk-based capital adequacy regulation. The standards will force
banks to change their strategies and policies in order to comply with
the more stringent capital requirements. Prices of some banking
products will increase, and securitization of assets will become more
prevalent. The standards will discourage consolidation within the
banking industry to a certain extent and make banks less competitive
in the financial services industry generally.
Bank regulators will continue to revisit this issue of adequate
bank capital, and changes in the standards will occur as regulators
review their effects on the banking industry.31 0 With changes already
under way, capital adequacy will prove to be the banking issue of the
1990s.
VII.

Addendum

Since this article was written in the summer of 1991, significant
changes have occurred in the stock markets in the United States and
Japan. The Nikkei index, a broad measure of the Japanese stock
market, has fallen in value by 50% over the past two years.31 1 In
March and April 1992, the index fell even further. The Topix index,
an even broader measure of share prices on the Tokyo stock exchange, closed at 1408 on March 18, 1992,312 which is below its ten
306. Brumbaugh, supra note 34, at 14.
307. Senate Report, supra note 36, at 15, (statement of Robert C. Clarke, Comptroller
of the Currency); id. at 38-39 (statement of William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC). The Office
of Thrift Supervision has postponed until late 1992 the implementation of interest-rate risk
regulations within the overall capital adequacy regulations. OTS Delays Incorporating Interest-Rate Rule, 57 BNA's BANKING REPORT 294 (Aug. 19, 1991).
308. Fossii, HIS Studies Tighter Capital Ratio Rules, Financial Times, May 30, 1991,
at 31. See also Cope, Treasury Plan May Run Afoul of Basle Talks, Amer. Banker, March
I1, 1991, at 2.
309. Orabutt, supra note 67, at 10A. See also Risk-based capital, supra note 133.
310. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
311. Further Still to Fall, The Economist, March 14, 1992, at 89.
312. On the Edge, The Economist, March, 21, 1992, at 82.
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year moving average.
The more widely watched Nikkei index fell below the 20,000
level mark on March 16, 1992. On March 18 the Nikkei index was
19,764.3 1 The decrease in share prices has detrimentally affected
the level of Tier 2 capital of Japanese banks. Japanese city banks
currently maintain Tier I capital at a level slightly above the required 4% minimum 3 14 which only leaves a thin cushion against a
rising number of bad loans. Forty-five percent of unrealized gains in
a bank's share portfolio may be included in Tier 2 capital. In March
1991 Japanese city banks counted 19 trillion yen of unrealized gains
as Tier 2 capital. In September 1991 this amount had decreased to
16.3 trillion because of the decline of share prices. In March 1992
unrealized gains only amounted to 13.2 trillion yen.315 The amount
of unrealized losses Japanese city banks applied towards Tier 2 capital decreased by nearly one third over a one year period. By another
estimate, given the current financial structure of the eleven Japanese
city banks, if the Nikkei index falls below 20,000 as it did in March
1992, at least four banks will be below the minimum Basle capital
ratio.31 If the Nikkei index falls below 16,000, as many as eight of
the eleven city banks will be below the Basle minimum." 7 As a result, Japanese city banks are finding it even more difficult to meet
the Basle capital standards. Managers of these banks appear not to
be worried about failing to comply with the standards. The only
sanction the banks could receive would be a prohibition on further
international expansion which is not currently a high priority given
their other problems (e.g., rising number of bad loans and a slowing
of the Japanese economy).3 18
In contrast, the stock markets in the U.S. have improved over
their lackluster performance in 1990 and early 1991. This fact was
especially evident twoards the end of 1991. For the entire year 1991,
banks raised $3.3 billion in common stock and $4.2 billion in preferred stock .3a1 This is nearly four times the amount of capital raised
in 1990. In the fourth quarter alone, banks raised $800 million of
preferred stock and $800 million in common stock. a 0 In the fourth
quarter of 1990, banks only raised $11 million of common stock and
313. Id. The Nikkei index in January 1990 was 37,951. At the end of 1990, the index
was 24,087. In March 1992 the index had fallen below 20,000 to 19,764. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Chandler, Japanese Banks Face Up to Capital Reality, Wall Street Journal, April
6, 1992, at A]3.
317. Id.
318. On the-Edge, The Economist, March 21, 1992, at 82.
319. Holland, For Capital-Hungry U.S. Banks, Fourth Quarter was a Time to Feast,
American Banker, Jan. 6, 1992, at 1.
320. Id.
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$100 million of preferred stock. 2 Banks issued $5.4 billion in subordinated debt in 1991 compared to $1.4 billion in 1990. In early
1992, Chemical Bank and Nationsbank announced that they plan to
issue new equity. Chemical announced that it will issue $1.4 billion
in new equity in 1992.322 Some analysts estimate that banks overall
may issue up to $5 billion in new equity in 1992.323 The price of the
bank stocks generally increased 83% from January 1991 to January
1992.324 Therefore, banks are attracted to the equity markets and
are better able to increase their capital by new equity offerings.
Contrary to the assertion in Section Ill(c) of the article, U.S.
banks in 1992 are finding it easier to raise equity capital in the stock
market. The stock market in 1992 is much healthier than in 1991 or
1990. As a result, U.S. banks are issuing equity in order to attain
the Basle capital standards. Given the market's strength and lower
interest rates, equity issues are a much more attractive and viable
method of increasing capital than asserted in the article.

321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.
American Banks: Past the Worst?, The Economist, Jan. 12, 1992, at 79.
Id.
Id.

